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Faced with an aging Navy air force, the EA-6B, a piece of the aging aircraft 
inventory puzzle, is included in a mandated program called Integrated Maintenance 
Concept (IMC.)  IMC incorporates a maintenance process called Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) to establish and adjust preventative maintenance requirements.  The 
premise of the program is to justify each preventative maintenance action to maintain 
obsolescent airframes while reducing aircraft out-of-service-time and operating support 
costs.  The implementation of a preventative maintenance program validated by RCM 
coupled with the fixed period end date (PED) will, in theory, reduce total ownership costs 
(TOC) to include reduced depot level turn around and scheduled maintenance time.   
The objective of this thesis is to ascertain how the move from SDLM to IMC is 
impacting the community from all perspectives and their views on readiness and 
supportability.  To gather data, the researcher conducted on-site interviews with key 
players at all levels of maintenance support.  IMC, with the incorporation of RCM 
justified preventative maintenance actions can positively impact the life of the aircraft 
however, to make it possible, the depot field site has to be fully supported and the 
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
A. PURPOSE 
This Thesis will determine how the transition from Standard Depot Level 
Maintenance (SDLM) to Integrated Maintenance Concept (IMC) has affected the three 
levels currently performing maintenance on the EA-6B aircraft.  The Thesis focuses on 
EA-6B support in Whidbey Island where there are currently 79 aircraft assigned:  72 
located with the squadrons and seven at the depot.  It addresses how IMC is to be 
incorporated on the aircraft, projected readiness levels and support issues.   
This thesis also examines current attitudes towards IMC implementation from 
several perspectives, including maintenance personnel at the Wing, organizational, 
intermediate, depot and contracted. 
 
B.  BACKGROUND 
The EA-6B “Prowler” aircraft became part of Navy’s inventory in 1971 and is the 
U.S. Navy’s only tactical jamming aircraft.  The last production aircraft rolled off the 
Grumman assembly line in 1991, and since that time the aircraft have gone through four 
major upgrades to prepare it for dynamic threats and expanding mission roles.  After 
retiring the Air force EF-111 Raven in 1998, it is the only national asset serving the front 
line on every strike package, carrier and land based, for the United States. 
There are 122 of these aircraft and approximately 98 at any given time are 
dispersed out to the fleet:  Navy, Marines and Naval Reserves. The remainder are located 
at the Depot or Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) undergoing some type of depot 
level repair, modification, SDLM and now, IMC.  Thirty-three of the aircraft have the 
latest upgrade:  Block 89A; one has the next scheduled upgrade: ICAP III; 25 are Block 
82s and are restricted from deploying to the carrier and the rest are Block 89 aircraft.  Of 
the total, 34 are restricted to 3 G’s.  There is not a replacement identified for the aircraft 
and because it is such a valuable asset, its service life was extended from 2005 to 2015.  
This will result in most of the aircraft reaching over 30 years of age at retirement.  
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Figure 1 EA-6B Prowler 
Faced with an aging Navy air force and many platforms without a replacement, 
senior leadership embarked on a mission to preserve its already tired inventory.  The EA-
6B, a piece of the aging aircraft inventory puzzle, is included in the best value solution to 
the dilemma and meeting affordable readiness goals; a mandated program called IMC.  
IMC incorporates a proactive maintenance process called Reliability Centered 
Maintenance (RCM) to establish and adjust preventative maintenance requirements for 
all three levels of support.  The premise of the program is to justify each preventative 
maintenance action to optimally maintain obsolescent airframes while reducing aircraft 
out-of-service-time and operating support costs.  In addition, IMC includes establishing a 
fixed period end date (PED) for each of the aircraft, which results in a standardized depot 
induction schedule.  The implementation of an accurate preventative maintenance 
program validated by RCM coupled with the fixed PED will, in theory, reduce total 
ownership costs (TOC) to include reduced depot level turn around and scheduled 
maintenance time. (TEAM, 1999)  
One of the arguments that justifies IMC utilizing RCM analysis is that we ‘over-
inspect” aircraft.  Opening panels and removing components to inspect, in many cases, is 
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not necessary and oftentimes leads to failed components just by the sheer removal and 
replacement process.   
Opponents of the mandated program say the military is shifting the maintenance 
burden from the depot level to the backs of our sailors in the organizational level, as a 
way to save money.  
Despite the pro and cons, is the answer IMC?   This paper explores how IMC is 
projected to impact aircraft readiness and availability, and how it will impact the various 
levels of maintenance once fully implemented in the EA-6B platform. 
 
C. SCOPE OF RESEARCH 
This research evaluates the impact of IMC and how it will affect EA-6B 
readiness, both short and long term at the depot and in aircraft assigned to NAS Whidbey 
Island.  Aircraft assigned to the Marines in Cherry Point, testing in Point Mugu and the 
Reserves at Andrews Air Force Base are not considered in this analysis.  To evaluate 
readiness, the research includes how IMC will affect organizational, intermediate and 
depot levels of maintenance and support. The objective is to determine the value of 
implementing the concept as a replacement to the SDLM and current preventative 
maintenance process.  Research includes analyzing current and planned EA-6B readiness 
and research in planned organizational, intermediate and depot roles in support and 
maintenance of the IMC process. 
  
D. METHOD OF RESEARCH 
The methodology used in this thesis research consisted of the following 
components: 
1.  Literature Review 
Reports on Aircraft Service Period Adjustment (ASPA)/SDLM and IMC lessons 
learned on other aircraft were reviewed.  A compilation of IMC and RCM documents 
from multiple sources were researched and studied to gain knowledge of the program.    
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2.  Interviews and Meetings 
Attended the Maintenance Action Group (MAG), which identified relevant issues 
pertaining to the EA-6B program.  On-site formal and informal meetings and interviews 
were conducted with key players in the organizational, intermediate, depot levels of 
maintenance, in addition to the Type Wing, RCM contractor, and NAVAIR to gather 
information on the status, popularity and success of the IMC program.   
3.  Data Acquisition and Analysis 
-Historical 3M summary data was collected for the past year to analyze trends.   
-IMC implementation data was collected to determine actual and predicted 
turnaround times and costs.   
-Draft plans for RCM and Planned Maintenance Inspections for the field and 
depot levels were obtained to compare the SDLM/ASPA inspections with the proposed 
phased maintenance interval (PMI)/IMC inspections.  
4.  Organization of Study 
Chapter II discusses the ASPA, IMC Program and how IMC is being 
implemented on the EA-6B aircraft. 
Chapter III analyzes the affects of IMC implementation on the three levels of 
maintenance and readiness. 
Chapter IV discusses the conclusions and recommendations drawn from the 
research and analysis.  There are also recommendations for further research. 
A list of acronyms used in this thesis is contained in Appendix A. 
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II.  DISCUSSION OF IMC PROGRAM 
A. ASPA 
The ASPA program was implemented in naval aircraft in 1984.  It was 
determined that inducting an aircraft into the SDLM process automatically at the end of 
its period end date (PED) did not make sense without first looking at the material 
condition of the aircraft.  There were cases where the aircraft was in excellent condition 
at the time of induction and instead of spending unnecessary funds on the aircraft 
overhaul, it would have been better to have the aircraft out in the fleet until it was ready 
for depot maintenance.    
When an aircraft reached its PED, the year and month at the end of the aircraft’s 
operating service period, it received an ASPA inspection by a qualified depot level field 
team.  If the team determined the aircraft was in sound material condition, it received a 
twelve-month extension at which time another ASPA inspection occurred.   
ASPA was intended to reduce the number of SDLM inductions and save money 
by changing the cycle from a constant on-time basis to an on-condition basis. (Hatcher, 
1997)  What resulted over time was the unpredicted nature when an aircraft would finally 
fail ASPA and have to be inducted into the depot.  ASPAs would fall once a year and the 
variability of the deferrals was random.  When an aircraft failed an ASPA in a forward 
deployed squadron, they had to send the aircraft back to the depot and await a relief 
aircraft, usually from a squadron that just returned from cruise or early in their training 
cycle.  Aircraft configuration managers had to jump through hoops to keep squadron 
aircraft inventories at the right number for where they were in the training cycle and 
correctly forecast the number of depot inductions to schedule.  When a bow wave of 
aircraft failed without scheduled funding in place, aircraft sat on the tarmac at the depot 
awaiting funding authorization and readiness declined.  
By 1998, squadrons did not have a full allowance of aircraft on the flight line.  
Department of the Navy (DoN) total aircraft inventory (TAI) was 3869, 255 aircraft 
below the total aircraft authorization (TAA) of 4124. (Note 1:  TAA is the sum of primary 
aircraft authorization (PAA) and Backup Aircraft Authorization or pipeline (BAA).) 
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Air Tycom and Type Wing staffs tried to mitigate the effect of the shortage by 
carefully managing aircraft assets and depot inductions, but were not able to preclude 
squadrons from falling below their authorized allowance during the turnaround cycle.  
They had to constantly transfer aircraft from one squadron to another to meet training and 
operational requirements.    
The aging aircraft inventory challenged maintenance efforts at all levels.  
Feedback from the NADEPs indicated a worsening trend in the material condition of the 
aircraft inducted, adversely impacting turnaround time reduction efforts and costs.  This 
was further exacerbated by the airframe engineering issues that began to surface, such as 
the F-14A fatigue life expended (FLE) reduction and the EA-6B wing FLE (AMSR, 
1998).  Immediate action was needed to stabilize the force to CNO inventory goals, and 























The trans ition from SDLM to IMC is endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations 
(CNO) and calls for selected aircraft programs to transition to fixed PEDs using RCM 
analysis as a sustained maintenance planning base.  It is a major component of the Navy’s 
Affordable Readiness Initiative and is expected to reduce maintenance costs and improve 
aircraft availability.  At the inception of IMC, aircraft under SDLM and paint and 
corrosion evaluation (PACE) programs accounted for over 70% of the total active aircraft 
inventory.  When IMC is fully implemented, PACE will be eliminated and F-14’s and 
four types of contractor-supported aircraft will be the only remaining SDLM aircraft, all 
of which are scheduled for retirement. (IMC, 1998) 
To improve the overall material condition of Navy aircraft, the CNO directed the 
Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) to develop a plan for making depot 
maintenance requirements more predictable and affordable.  The transition plan is to be 
expedited by NAVAIR 3.0 to reduce the time aircraft spend in depot maintenance and 
review scheduled maintenance requirements based on RCM analysis.  The primary goals 
of the IMC program are: 
-fixed period end dates.  This will identify a specific number of depot level 
inductions to budget for each year.  With the SDLM program, this was not possible 
because it was an estimate banking on most aircraft not failing ASPA until a future date. 
-integrated depot- level/organizational- level maintenance tasks based on RCM 
analysis.  This is designed to eliminate redundancy and reduce costs.   
Other objectives include: 
-increased aircraft availability.  The result is more shadows on the ramp instead of 
homesteading at the depot waiting for funding authorization, which helps realize PAA 
objectives. 
-implementation plan that is at least cost neutral compared to current SDLM 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) budget.  No additional funds will be made 
available just because a program shifts from SDLM based depot maintenance to IMC.   
-reduced long term ownership costs.  This is the sum of all the financial resources 
necessary to support a platform from inception to disposal.  
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-improved material condition over the life of the aircraft.   The integrity of our 
aircraft safety will not be compromised. 
To satisfy the primary IMC goals, there are three main elements that make up the 
program as defined in NAVAIRINST 4790.33:   
-RCM analysis that includes reviewing all maintenance tasks without regard to 
specific levels of repair or organizational structure.  It relies on decision logic for 
defining PM tasks that are applicable and effective for a specific set of failure modes and 
effects.  
-consolidation of maintenance tasks that minimize the duplication of effort among 
organizational (O), intermediate (I) and depot (D) levels.  Reducing the number of tasks 
and combining multi- level tasks may yield significant reductions in aircraft down time, 
an important objective of IMC.  The most effective, economical overall solution will be 
recommended based on RCM data analysis. 
-fixed PEDs that are established on a Type/Model/Series (T/M/S)-by-T/M/S basis 
according to RCM Preventative Maintenance (PM) task, operational and economic 
analysis. 
In accordance with NAVAIRINST 4790.20A, RCM engineering analysis will be 
revised to develop and identify PM tasks that will result in the highest degree of 
availability and readiness at the lowest overall life cycle cost.  IMC targets improvement 
in the overall material condition of the aircraft to minimize life-cycle costs and out of 
service time. 
Using the P-3 and E-6A maintenance programs as a baseline, representatives from 
the engineering, logistics and industrial competencies, along with members of the N881 
staff, decided on a two-step process for the formal transition of an aircraft platform from 
SDLM to IMC.  It is left up to the program teams to determine exactly how their 
individual IMC programs look, but before embarking on full-scale implementation, the 
proposed process has to be authorized by the CNO (N881).  For example, the absolute 
minimum requirement to transition to IMC can be met by simply eliminating all 
ASPA/PACE inspections and conducting SDLM/modification, corrosion, and paint 
program (MCAPP) on fixed schedules.  However, this is considered a last resort after all 
other options are considered.  The proposed process then has to be validated on a number 
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of prototype aircraft as determined by the program office and type commanders.  The 
validation stage gathers specific detailed data on the implementation, long-term costs and 
potential benefits, and IMC execution concerns.   
After the validation process is completed, the second step requires individual 
program teams to seek final approval from N88 (via code N881) to change their 
maintenance concept and implement IMC across the entire platform.  This step requires 
detailed cost figures, specific benefits derived from IMC, and a bureau number (BUNO) 
by BUNO baseline/transition plan. (NALDA, 2001) 
 
D. IMC PLAN FOR EA-6B 
NAVAIR 3.2 provided start-up funding for the program in fiscal year 1998 
through an IMC initiative.  Funding was increased to $2.4M annually from FY98 to 
FY02.  During FY99, the IMC/RCM Level II Integrated Product Team (IPT), a multi-
disciplined team, was chartered by PMA-234 to implement an RCM based IMC program.  
Training was held for team members on failure mode, effects and criticality analysis 
(FMECA)/RCM; from there, analysis is a continuous process throughout the life of the 
aircraft under the IMC maintenance program concept. 
Documentation on the EA-6B aircraft service history is formidable and the failure 
history, though not as extensive, is fairly well recorded.  Throughout the last thirty years, 
maintenance requirements were added to the initial deck based on failure occurrences and 
some degree of engineering analysis.  What resulted is a MRC deck that is a culmination 
of malfunction documentation, not based on RCM data, but on when access to a 
particular panel makes the most sense during an inspection cycle.  The end product is a 
huge laundry list of unjustified inspections and over- inspection of the aircraft as a whole. 
It was decided early in the IMC concept exploration phase that the IPT would not 
change the world or reinvent the wheel, which meant the new program would be based on 
historical data and the maintenance program in place; changes or improvements would be 
made from there where necessary.  Initial RCM analysis candidates were developed from 
items that had existing scheduled maintenance requirements, significant failure rates or 
that would potentially impact safety, aircraft availability or operating cost. 
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During the past three years, over 750 failure modes have been analyzed using the 
work unit code (WUC) manual, NAVAIR 01-250HD-8, in developing the hardware 
breakdown (Oglesby, 2002).  The end result is an eight year IMC depot cycle, base- lined 
on the previous inspection cycles and phased maintenance interval field events (PMIF), 
that are actually supercharged ASPA inspections that occur biennially vice annually.  
(PMA-234, 2000)   
It should be noted that the failure modes analyzed do not include the J52-P408 
engine and related systems because there is a separate RCM program for engines.  Other 
systems, such as the ejection seats or other system components that do not fall under the 
cognizance of the EA-6B Field Support Team (FST), will be coordinated where 
necessary, but are currently not under the IMC plan.  Although a particular component 
may have equal impact in the readiness and availability of the aircraft, those components 
outside the scope of the EA-6B IMC maintenance plan will not be addressed in depth in 
this discussion or program analysis. 
Once the objectives were clear, the program goals were presented to the fleet on 
27 April 2000 (MCAS Cherry Point, 2000). 
-Fixed PED. 
-Decrease pipeline aircraft to meet the PAA of 106. 
-Increase aircraft operational readiness. 
-Maintain cost neutrality (as a minimum) with current maintenance program. 
-Reduce year-to-year variability of maintenance workload. 
-Improve overall material condition of aircraft. 
-Maintain/improve structural integrity of aircraft. 
-Reduce overall fleet maintenance burden. 
-Develop RCM based preventative maintenance (PM) program. 
Metrics used to monitor program goals are: 
-Aircraft Inventory/PAA 
-Cost using NAVAIR 4.2.5 Business Case Analysis (BCA) Templates 
-Maintenance Manhours (MMH)/Flight Hour 
-Aircraft Availability/Readiness  
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The IMC implementation plan, as depicted in Appendix B., shows the IPT 
Concept Implementation Meeting was held July 18-20, 2000, and the concept defined in 
August 2000.  Concept definition consists of the following and is shown below:  
 
Figure 2. IMC Concept Definition 
 
The total operational and service period will be eight years, divided into four two- 
year inspection cycles.  Phased Maintenance Interval Depot (PMI1) begins with induction 
into the depot; that is when the clock starts.  A goal of a six-month turn around time at the 
depot would then have the aircraft back in the fleet and ready to fly. (The six-month 
turnaround time is based on an aircraft that has been through at least one PMI field event 
cycle and has no modifications incorporated.)   
Eighteen months later (a total of two years from the date of induction to PMI1), 
the aircraft is scheduled for PMI2, where the organizational level makes the aircraft ready 
for inspection and a depot field inspection team (DFIT) from NADEP Jacksonville 
inspects the aircraft and grades discrepancies as critical, significant and informational 
only, with the level of repair required annotated.  The depot field repair team (DFRT) is 
then responsible for fixing the depot level discrepancies; the O-level is responsible for 
inducting I- level discrepancies, fixing organizational discrepancies and closing up the 
aircraft. 
Four years from the original PMI1 date of induction, the aircraft is then due for 
PMI3 and six years later PMI4.  The average out-of-service time for each field event is 
scheduled to be 14 calendar days.  On the eighth year, the aircraft is inducted back into 
the depot for extensive disassembly, strip and paint, visual inspections, systems checks, 











































non-destructive inspections (NDIs) and zonal inspections; again, with the goal of six 
months out-of-service time.  
General considerations were taken into account when designing the PMI schedule 
including a consistent workload:  no more than 15-16 aircraft per year in each phase; no 
more than two to three aircraft in work at any one field location at once; and impact was 
reduced on the existing infrastructure by minimizing overall hangar space requirements 
and organizational level support equipment (SE) utilization. (MCAS Cherry Point, 2000) 
Scheduled maintenance under the IMC concept is designed to perform only those 
jobs that are RCM justified, which alleviates maintainers of performing unnecessary tasks 
and eliminates redundancy.  As a result, organizational level maintenance is relieved of 
2804 scheduled maintenance man hours previously performed on one aircraft in a year.  
A 364-day inspection cycle is implemented, which replaces the former 224/448 day 
inspections and includes many of the 28/56 day special inspection tasks.  See Table 1 for 






Table 1. Availability/O-Level Workload 
 
Another added benefit to the 364-day special inspection interval is that it is 
designed to marry up with when the PMI events are due.  (If it is necessary, the 364 day 
can be re-based to give maintenance managers flexibility.)  Redundancy in effort is even 
further reduced compared to the labor intensive ASPA inspection. 
In October 2000, the Prototype plan was submitted for approval through the IMC 
Review Board; the Process was approved February 2001 for seven aircraft to become 
IMC prototypes.  Four of the prototypes were located at Whidbey Island, two at Cherry 
Point and one at the depot, see Table 2. 
Date Event Buno Location 
Feb 26 IMCF2 163522 NASWI 
Apr 02 IMCF2 163403 NASWI 
Apr 30 IMCF4 163884 NASWI 
Jun 15 IMCF2 163402 NASWI 
Jun 18 IMCD 160786 NADEPJAX 
Jul 15 IMCF6 162228 MCAS CP 
Aug 20 IMCF2 161880 MCAS CP 
Table 2. FY 01 Prototype Schedule/Buno/Locations 
 
 
4 A/C Squadron over 2 Years
Pre IMC IMC
Interval Mhrs Total Mhrs TAT Total TAT Interval Mhrs Total Mhrs TAT Total TAT
14 26 2704 0.5 52 14 26 2704 0.5 52
28 93 4836 3 156 28 14 728 0.5 26
56 126 6552 5 260 56 11 572 0.5 26
224 194 2328 5 60 364 200 1600 5 40
ASPA 6 30 2 16 IMCF 109 436 14 56
Annual MHRS 16450 492 Annual MHRS 6040 148
Delta -10410 -344
 106 A/C  over 2 Years
Pre IMC IMC
Interval Mhrs Total Mhrs TAT Total TAT Interval Mhrs Total Mhrs TAT Total TAT
14 26 71656 0.5 1378 14 26 71656 0.5 1378
28 93 128154 3 4134 28 14 19292 0.5 689
56 126 173628 5 6890 56 11 15158 0.5 689
224 194 61692 5 1590 364 200 42400 5 1060
ASPA 6 795 2 424 IMCF 109 11554 14 1484
Annual MHRS 435925 13038 Annual MHRS 160060 3922
Delta -275865 -9116
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VAQ-140 was selected to take the first four prototypes at Whidbey Island.  The 
idea was to have the aircraft in one squadron to keep data as pure as possible and to 
isolate the prototypes from the SDLM aircraft.  It also alleviated any confusion for the 
maintainers. 
Scheduled prototypes go through the PMI process; a rigorous field inspection, and 
at that time are assigned a biennial period; either 2, 3 or 4 years based on the last SDLM 
induction.  In addition, new RCM based maintenance requirement cards (MRCs) are used 
for all preventative maintenance actions on the aircraft.  (An RCM based phase deck is 
scheduled to replace the current phase deck in the preventative maintenance program on 
the prototype aircraft in the August 2002 timeframe  (Ogelsby, 2002).)    
All other aircraft remain on the current MRC cycle until they are due a 224-day 
inspection.  Upon completion of the scheduled inspection, the most manpower intensive 
in the current MRC cycle, the aircraft are formally switched over to the new RCM based 
MRC’s, but are still considered SDLM aircraft until a PMI field or depot event is 
completed  (Barry, 2002).   
The original schedule had full transition to IMC slated for early FY02, but the 
prototype schedule was delayed due to an OPNAV requirement for a material condition 
review.  There were also delays in the FY01 prototype funding and inductions, so the 
revised plan changed the original 30 aircraft (17 at Whidbey) scheduled for full 
implementation in FY02 to become prototypes instead (see Table 3.) 
The schedule was changed to FY03 for full implementation.  However, as of this 
writing, the schedule has slid to early FY04 to allow the OEM, Grumman, to also induct 
and complete a prototype.  The scheduled number of aircraft prototypes for FY 03 is:  11 
Marine, 27 Navy, three Reserves and three depot/OEM inductions.  There will still be 








•SDLM IMCF 2 IMCF 4 IMCF-6 IMCD 
•158030 163525 158033 162936 158801 
•158542 156481 158800 162228 161243 
•158802 160436 160433 164403 163400 
•159584 163886 160707 158816  
•159911  160788 159583*  
•160437  161118 161115  
•161350  161775 161119  
•161779  161882 161242  
•162938  162227 163395  
•162939  163396 163398  
•163031  163399   
•163032  163404   
•163047  163521   
•  163891   
•  164401   
Total•  164402   
13 4 16 10 3 
Table 3. Scheduled Prototype Aircraft FY02 
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III. ANALYSIS OF IMC AFFECTS ON MAINTENANCE LEVELS 
A. DEPOT LEVEL 
 
Figure 3 NADEP Jacksonville, Florida (March 2002). 
 
1.  Depot Site 
IMC directly impacts the depot in numerous ways.  It is the vehicle for reducing 
overall aircraft operating and support costs and, as envisioned by NAVAIR, a large 
amount of airframe maintenance normally performed at the depot site will be performed 
at the operating site.  This reduces workload for the depot.  However, the Jacksonville 
EA-6B depot team does not view IMC as a threat to their livelihood.  It is viewed as a 
change they will adapt to.       
When the IMC concept was first introduced to EA-6B depot management, they 
were resolved to help meet the following goals: 
-cost neutrality 
-product improvement (leading to increased readiness) 
-depot level maintenance stays depot level maintenance (no transfer of 
responsibility to a lower level) 
-no redundancy if possible  
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These goals played a key role in how the maintenance plan is drafted today.   
The EA-6B depot line has historically had 100-120 people working on the depot’s 
aircraft, but has had to increase manning to approximately 150-180 technicians because 
of scheduled aircraft modifications and SDLM/IMC.  The average age is around 46 years 
old, as with all depots.  Most employees have had either EA-6B, A-6 or some other prior 
aircraft maintenance experience.  As time passes and people become retirement eligible, 
it is a valid management concern that a lot of corporate knowledge will be lost.  To 
counteract the affects of an aging workforce, program management is constantly on the 
lookout to hire, when authorized, to maintain their core capabilities (Hood, 2002). 
Management was asked if they anticipate maintaining current employment or will 
there be a substantially decreasing workload after the full transition to IMC is completed.  
The response was that current employment would be justified with the modifications 
scheduled at least until 2008 and possibly throughout the life of the aircraft.  The man-
hour reduction in workload between SDLM and IMC aircraft will be offset by scheduled 
concurrent modifications.  A positive change with the IMC program is that depot 
inductions are scheduled and it will be easier to plan for the workload; in the past, the 
workload was unpredictable because it was based on ASPA failures (Pearce, 2002.) 
Comparing SDLM (NAVAIR, 2000) and IMC (IMC Draft, 2000) specifications 
make them appear quite similar to one another.  The last few revisions of the SDLM 
specifications have made its requirements much like that of IMC.  Many of the changes 
are subtle, but the biggest ones include:  transferring the main landing gear from a SDLM 
requirement to a ten year scheduled removal at the fleet and deleting the DITMCO test 
and evaluation from the IMC specification.  Both changes are RCM justified, however, 
they do two things, take away work from the depot and place the burden on the sailor’s 
backs. 
The main landing gear overhaul will be done in ten-year increments, vice every 
depot induction, and is something the organizational level will have to manage.  There is 
only one set of dummy struts stationed at NAS Whidbey, however, the strut is listed on 
the consolidated remain- in-place list (CRIPL) and does not have to be turned in until a 
replacement is available.  Wing Maintenance does not view the change as a negative 
impact on the squadrons (Bunch, 2002.) 
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DITMCO is a huge piece of test equipment (Fig #) that all of the aircraft systems 
are plugged into and checked.  The test set checks for wiring continuity, insulation 
resistance, dielectric breakdown and inductance.  It also tests for the proper operation of 
resistors, relays, diodes, capacitors and circuit breakers.  Hooking up the aircraft to the 
test set is a time consuming process and requires experienced technicians.  Once the 
aircraft is plugged in, it takes an average of five weeks for a complete wiring check.  By 
removing DITMCO from the depot specification, the only time an aircraft will get a full 
systems check is if it is going through a major wiring modification, for example, the 
Block 82-89A upgrade.  Otherwise it is not done (Pearce, 2002.)   
RCM analysts believe DITMCO has the potential to induce problems into systems 
by plugging and unplugging cannon plugs, stretching wire bundles or human error, such 
as bent pins.  This disqualifies it from being a RCM justified maintenance action 
(Oglesby, 2002).  The budget cutters see deleting DITMCO has a huge cost savings.  It 
will reduce turn around time by over a month per aircraft. 
 
Figure 4 DITMCO Test Set 
 
The depot views deleting the test as a potential maintenance liability and cost 
driver to them and the fleet.  Flight control and safe for flight systems checks are not 
performed until the aircraft has almost completed the IMC process.  If a problem is 
detected at that time, the depot’s artisans have to troubleshoot the particular system.  If 
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the problem is something complicated to isolate, the time saved by not performing 
DITMCO on the aircraft can easily be eaten up trying to identify what is wrong with the 
system.  Had it gone through DITMCO, the problem could have been identified and fixed 
early on with no change in the scheduled delivery of the aircraft (Hood, 2002.)   
The fleet just wants the aircraft systems to work.  If not DITMCO, than at least 
turn on and operationally check all of the systems to verify they work properly (Bunch, 
Gibbons, 2002.)  Right now, as the specifications are written, only safety of flight 
systems, such as flight controls and those listed in the MESM as downing discrepancies, 
are checked to verify proper operation.   
Mission systems, such as armament, ALQ and USQ, are not part of the 
specification and not even turned on.  This places a huge workload on the squadron 
receiving the aircraft from the depot.  If there is a problem with the aircraft, it could take 
months to troubleshoot and fix the discrepancy.  Worst case, the squadron will live with it 
because they lack the technical expertise or proper test equipment when it could have 
been fixed at the depot in a fraction of the time. 
Another point to be made with EA-6B IMC is that it does not change the level of 
maintenance the depot can perform.  Organizational maintenance still cannot be 
performed at the depot, just as with the SDLM program.  Noted-But-Not-Corrected 
(NBNC) lists will still accompany the aircraft to the squadron, just as they have in the 
past.  NBNC lists can be quite lengthy and burdensome for the fleet; however, the depot 
is not authorized to perform the maintenance, so when an aircraft is delivered to a fleet 
squadron it is accurate to say that it is never full mission capable (FMC).  
So far, two aircraft have been inducted into the depot for PMI 1 as prototype 
aircraft.  The first, BUNO 160786, was inducted 18 June 2001 and completed 9 April 
2002.  BUNO 158801 was inducted 14 November 2001 and is currently going through 
the IMC process.  The disparity in predicted six month out-of-service goal and actual 
IMC completion dates for the first prototype can be attributed mostly to process 
expectations versus actual execution.  Furthermore, the aircraft had not been IMC base-
lined in the fleet, so sealant, corrosion preventative compound (CPC), etc. had not been 
applied to the aircraft.  The aircraft was a true representation of the material condition of 
the aircraft coming from the fleet for depot overhaul. 
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BUNO 160786 is not going to be returned directly to the fleet because it is 
scheduled for a follow-on Block 82-89A modification.  The fleet will not see an IMC1 
aircraft until late 2002.  At least the first two IMC prototypes will have back-to-back 
IMC/modification to get a true picture of how long an IMC event takes.  In the future, 
IMC/modifications will be scheduled concurrently to reduce TAT and maximize aircraft 
availability to operational units. 
Overall, the EA-6B depot production manager views IMC as a good thing and 
welcomes the change.  The added benefit to be able to schedule aircraft inductions, 
improved material condition of the aircraft and a busy modification schedule outweighs 












2.  Field Site 
In-service-repair (ISR) teams are satellite detachments supported by the regional 
depot.  The Navy has three Aviation Depots (NADEPs) in the United States:  San Diego, 
California; Jacksonville, Florida; and Cherry Point, North Carolina.  The NADEPs all fall 
under the same auspice, however they compete for funding.  It is a political process 
where aircraft located west of the Mississippi are supported by the San Diego NADEP 
and aircraft east of the Mississippi are supported by the Jacksonville NADEP.  Funding is 
divided between the depots in this manner regardless of where the subject matter 
expertise for a particular aircraft is located. 
The Whidbey Island ISR team currently consists of a team leader, four full time 
artisans and two temporarily assigned from San Diego.  They provide depot level support 
to the I- level and aircraft assigned to the station, mainly EA-6Bs and P-3s. 
With the implementation of IMC and the PMI field events, the ISR team also 
became the DFRT team.  At that time there was an understanding that the ISR team 
would be augmented with permanently assigned artisans from San Diego.  This was to 
help in taking on the additional workload the field events would place on the team 
(Bonnet, 2002.)   
Unlike ASPA inspections that were performed by a permanently assigned artisan 
from San Diego, a DFIT team that is stationed out of Jacksonville, Florida performs PMI 
inspections.  The field events are much more complex than the ASPA inspections and 
involve more challenging and complex repairs.  TAT for the first 14 completed field 
events ranged from 13 to 23 days, an average of 19.2 days to complete the inspection, 
repair and return to service.  The preliminary estimate for a PMI event was 14 days.  Cost 
estimates were predicted to be $42,000 for depot and $1,786 for O-level consumables.  
Actual costs for the first eight events averaged $30,927 and $2,330 for D and O-levels, 
respectively (Boone, 2002).  See Table 4 for individual breakdown. 
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LABOR/TRAVEL/MATERIAL COSTS
PROTOTYPE First Second Third Fourth Fifth Sixth Seventh Eighth Average
DFIT $17,782 $17,782 $17,286 $22,023 $21,796 $20,227 $21,576 $24,939 $18,158
DFRT $13,010 $11,224 $20,249 $20,249 $2,620 $16,749 $17,784 $6,105 $12,000
Depot Material $364 $315 $1,729 $842 $1,473 $1,479 $565 $165 $771
Total Depot Costs $31,156 $29,321 $39,264 $43,114 $25,889 $38,455 $39,925 $31,209 $30,927
O Level Material
     Consumables $1,786 $9,227 $915 $330 $3,583 $34 $4,299 $792 $2,330
     Repairables $38,696 $96,520 $98,320 $0 $30,890 $70,490 $0 $0 $37,214
Total O level Material $40,482 $105,747 $99,235 $330 $34,473 $70,524 $4,299 $792 $39,543
Notes:
Prototypes 1,5,6:  O-level repairables include items turned into AIMD for repair.  This reflects AVDLR costs if BCM'd.
Prototype 7:   Port horizontal stabilizer and starboard inboard flap assembly were repaired by DFRT on aircraft.  
Table 4. IMCF Prototype Costs 
 
 With this increased workload, the ISR/DFRT has been tasked to the maximum 
extent possible.  They have been working seven days a week since November 2001, and 
the team did not receive support from NADEP North Island until March 2002.  That 
support came in the form of temporary vice permanent personnel.  The mentality of the 
temporarily assigned personnel is temporary; however, the workload is permanent. 
As with the depots, the ISR team is also made up of an aging workforce.  On the 
permanent team the youngest artisan is 46 and the oldest 69.  Working seven days a week 
has been possible because of the workforce’s mentality in keeping the fleet flying; 
however, it cannot continue indefinitely.  
Finally, to add to their already incredible workload, the ISR team is doing O and I 
level repairs on many of the airframe components.  This reflects lack of structural 
knowledge and manpower at both the O and I levels and is addressed in greater detail in 
the sections that follow.  
      
B. INTERMEDIATE LEVEL 
Based on FY 2000 projections, the I- level will initially be inundated with failed 
flight control surfaces:  FY 01-41; FY 02-246; and FY 03-264 (July Meeting, 2000.)  
Currently these predictions have not come to pass. However, if they do, the I-level will 
not be able to support such failure rates.  There are across the board manpower shortages 
at the AIMD.  Despite the fact an increase in personnel has been justified and approved, 
end strength manning levels do not allow the billets to be filled.  Specifically in the 
airframes work center, the Activity Manning Document (AMD) authorizes 41 personnel 
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in the AM ratings, but because of current manning levels, the AIMD Enlisted 
Distribution Verification Report (EDVR) dated 2/19/02 lists basic allowance (BA) and 
Navy manpower (NMP) at 39 and 32 respectively.  There are 35 sailors currently on 
board (COB) with only 30 in the work center projected on board nine months out 
(POB9).  These sailors support the entire air station’s I- level airframe repair requirements 
(Kellow, 2002.)      
Knowledge is also lacking in the AIMD for basic structures repair.  This can be 
attributed to both training and experience.  The on-site depot level field team provides 
repair capability if it is beyond the AIMD’s capability.  Of the flight surfaces that are 
inducted into AIMD, it was predicted that annual BCMs beginning 2001 would total 36, 
198 and 215, respectively.  AVDLR costs will potentially skyrocket, however the 
requirement for replacement flight control surfaces will have to be filled.   
There has also been discussion to set up a contract field team (CFT) to augment 
the work center’s affected by the surge in flight control surface failures, but nothing 
concrete has been set up.  
The increase in expected demand for replacement flight control surfaces has 
arisen because a tap test has been added to the PMI events that was not part of the ASPA 
inspection.  Furthermore, there is no historical demand/usage data on flight control 
surfaces (flaps, slats and ailerons).  Repairs have not been by the book:  1-order the part;  
2-AIMD inducts the part and either repairs it, does a P&E request for the local ISR to fix 
it or it gets BCM’d.  Instead, the ISR would repair a flight control surface that was 
deemed bad without a P&E request, because the AIMD felt it was not necessary at the 
time.  This practice no longer occurs, but the result is that there was a lack of documented 
usage; “F” condition assets were sent to the NAVICP warehouse where they sat and were 
not turned in to the depot for repair. 
Once the problem was identified, the RCM team from Veridian went to NAVICP. 
Out of over 600 assets, they identified 418 salvageable repairable parts.  Relying on the 
RCM analysis team’s predications, NAVICP has agreed to fund the restoration to “A” 
condition based on projected demand vice actual.  The assets are currently being cycled 
through the depot in small batches and replaced on the shelf as ready for issue (RFI) 
(Oglesby, Bunch, 2002.) 
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By the end of FY 04, all EA-6B aircraft are scheduled to be under the IMC 
program and employing the new inspection processes, by then defective flight control 
surfaces should be identified and corrected.  At that point, the amount of I- level 
inductions should level out to a minimal amount.   
The potential for other critical high failure items to be identified as the aircraft 
systems age is inevitable.  Once identified, they must be dealt with in the most effective 
and efficient way possible.  RCM analysts are predicting hydraulic reservoirs to be next 
on the horizon. 
Overall, the I- level is skeptical of the IMC program.  Many view it as a huge 
surge in a workload for which they are not manned.  RCM analysts say it is short term 
and will level out once all of the aircraft have cycled through the first PMI (Shilito, 
2002).  
 
C. ORGANIZATIONAL LEVEL 
1.  Military 
There are 16 squadrons stationed at NAS Whidbey Island, WA (including the 
training squadron and pre-commissioned squadron that does not have aircraft) with a total 
of 72 aircraft assigned.  This number does not include the seven aircraft assigned to 
squadrons that are undergoing depot maintenance either at Jacksonville or Saint 
Augustine. 
VAQ 129, the training command, has 17 aircraft and the rest are divided up 
between the 14 operational squadrons each having no more than four aircraft at a time 
(unless in between aircraft transfers and acceptances).   
The aircraft is labor intensive to maintain.  When it was first introduced to the 
fleet and until the late eighties, maintenance man-hours per flight hour (MMH/FH) 
averaged around 30 hours.  In calendar year 2001, the Wing averaged 60.9 MMH/FH 
with averages per squadron ranging from 44.3 to 106.1 MMH/FH.  (See Appendix C for 
complete breakdown.) 
The first IMC results were formally reported to the fleet at the annual 
Maintenance Action Group (MAG) meeting, August 2001.  VAQ 140 had been tasked to 
be the initial prototype squadron and had been on the new MRC deck since March.   The 
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maintenance officer gave a very positive brief on his squadron’s experience with the 
IMC.  When he told of a 65 percent decrease in scheduled maintenance requirements, the 
fleet responded with initial doubt, but as the numbers were displayed on actual times for 
scheduled maintenance inspections, they became very interested.  For example, a 56-day 
special inspection that used to take three days had been pared down to one eight-hour 
shift to complete (figure 6).  This alone was a huge scheduling burden lifted off of the 
maintenance manager’s shoulders, let alone relief for the maintainers (Brabner, 2001.) 
• 56 DAY AIRCRAFT SPECIAL INSPECTION
• SDLM/ASPA PROGRAM IMC PROTOTYPE
5 WORKING DAYS 1 WORKING DAY
228 MAN HOURS 53 MAN HOURS
82 HOURS 19 HOURS
 
Figure 6. VAQ 140 Presentation, MAG meeting, August 2001. 
 
The Wing was and continues to be very “pro” IMC/RCM.  They have also been 
very organized in implementing the program.  They did a great job in selling the program 
and getting the squadrons on board.  Choosing one squadron as the prototype and having 
them present their results at the 2001 MAG meeting was a terrific selling point.  In 
addition, transition to IMC was made easier because documentation procedures that 
minimized confusion were put in place early on in the prototype process.  Together these 
played a key role in gaining support from the fleet; which overall has been positive.       
However, there is a trade off.  The new MRC deck saves a lot of time and the 
aircraft are more available, but during the biennial depot field events the maintainers are 
required to do more than required by an ASPA.  The inspection team goes into more 
depth, such as tap testing every flight control surface, identifying worn bushings and 
splices, etc.   
The 364-day special inspection is the most labor intensive of the special 
inspections.  Panels that have not been opened for a year, that were normally opened 
during a 28-day inspection, may hold some surprises.  VAQ 140 completed the very first 
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364-day prototype inspection in March 2002, while on cruise on the JOHN F. 
KENNEDY (CV-67).  It took seven days instead of the predicted five days to complete; 
though part of the time can be attributed to getting hangar space.  There were no surprises 
when the panels were opened; optimistically, this is good sign that the aircraft have been 
over- inspected in the past and RCM based maintenance works (Pirosek, 2002.) 
Overall, the fleet maintainers like the new MRC deck.  But, they are, a bit leery 
about whether we are now under- inspecting the aircraft.  They have been conditioned to a 
56-day special inspection that lasts five days; and signing it off in two shifts almost 
seems like cheating  (Surveys, 2001) 
One negative aspect of IMC viewed by maintenance managers is the fixed 
PED/PMI .  They are used to the nine-month ASPA inspection scheduling window; now 
it will require closer monitoring to schedule the PMI events.  With IMC, there is a three-
month window.  The inspection can be pulled two months early or not done until the very 
last day of the month when the PED/PMI is due.  Some managers feel that a three-month 
window does not give them the flexibility they need to schedule such a major inspection.  
If deployed when the inspection is due, waivers will be considered.  Ideally, an inspection 
team will be brought in to perform the inspection.  However, if there is depot repair to be 
done, it could mean the aircraft would be grounded until qualified repairs can be made.  
How that will be resolved is still in the process of being worked out. 
The Navy EA-6B Configuration manager and fleet maintenance managers are 
also concerned because the fixed PED is based on the induction date of the aircraft going 
in for PMI, vice the date it is released from the depot.  Based on the induction date, the 
time starts ticking toward the next inspection before the fleet even sees the aircraft.  With 
modifications done in conjunction with PMI1, an aircraft will feasibly remain in the 
depot for over a year; the aircraft would be due for PMI2 after less than one year back in 
the fleet (Johannsen, 2002.)  However, RCM engineers argue, that the aircraft never stops 
aging and therefore the induction date is justified. (Ogelsby, 2002) 
There may be some relief with the current PED system.  Right now what is 
driving the eight year scheduled depot induction is the RCM paint analysis.  If another 
type of paint can be used that lasts longer or the paint used right now is not applied until 
the end of the depot visit, than PMI2 can possibly take place three years after depot 
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induction vice two.  The PED would than be at nine year intervals vice eight.  That 
concept has yet to be approved by RCM analysts. (Hayes, 2002) 
Bottom line is that the aircraft will be in the fleet for at least eight years without a 
depot visit.  Organizational level maintenance personnel and the ISR will be tasked to 
perform any maintenance action required on the aircraft.  PMI field events will be 
corrected on site.  It will be a rare occurrence, if ever, that an aircraft will be sent to the 
depot for repair during the field events.    
 
2.  Contracted Field Team (CFT) 
With MMH/FH doubled in the last ten years, and manning levels unchanged, the 
squadron’s maintenance workload has been huge.  The worst hit is the training command, 
VAQ 129.  Getting student aviators qualified in the aircraft in a timely manner has 
become increasingly difficult.  Jets were not available because of the scheduled 
maintenance burden and the increase in non-mission capable discrepancies.  When the 
aircraft are flying; life is drained from them by continuous hot pump/crew switch 
evolutions.      
In November 2000, relief finally came to the training squadron in the form of a 21 
man Raytheon CFT.  They perform the scheduled maintenance while squadron personnel 
work on downing discrepancies, the flight line and man training detachments.  The 
squadron was able to log over 8,500 flight hours in FY 2001, and catch up on the aviator 
backlog.  In FY 2002, the CFT dropped to 19 personnel, but they continue to play a 
critical role in the success of the training command.  Wing Maintenance supports 
continuing the CFT role despite the decline in scheduled maintenance actions.  Raytheon 
still provides the consistency needed to maintain squadron readiness and aircraft 







D. IMC AND EA-6B READINESS 
Despite the fact there has been a 65 percent decrease in scheduled maintenance 
requirements after implementing IMC, there is no significant difference in readiness 
between the prototype squadron (VAQ 140) and the rest of the fleet squadrons.  There is 
also no obvious difference between squadrons with prototypes and those without.  
(Appendix C). 
A huge readiness degrader that is devastating current EA-6B readiness and was 
not addressed earlier in the paper because it is not part of the EA-6B IMC program are 
the J52-P408 Pratt and Whitney engines.  They have been failing at an incredible rate.  
Two aircraft were lost late last year due to catastrophic engine failures that caused both 
crews to eject from the aircraft.  Since that time, the fleet has been on five-hour engine oil 
samples with no relief in sight.  As of this writing, the training command has 21 bare 
firewalls.  
With the direct impact the engine plays in readiness, it is difficult to measure 
whether the IMC program has positively affected the fleet.          
Theoretically, as material condition improves by replacing flight control surfaces 
and other readiness degraders, there should be an increase in readiness and aircraft 
availability.  Maintenance actions based on RCM analysis will result in substantially 
fewer hours than were once devoted to scheduled maintenance time; this will equate to 
increased aircraft availability for the flight schedule.   
Unfortunately, the aircraft will continue to age and realistically there will always 
be something unexpected that fails and negatively impacts aircraft readiness and 
availability.  Those that will be directly affected are the operational units, the training 
command and most likely the ISR team.  One way to counteract or at least neutralize the 
potential negative impacts are to continue to aggressively analyze failure modes as soon 
as they start to appear, to possibly head off a catastrophic failure or readiness degrader.  
Another is to ensure training is available so that failures can be recognized early in the 
inspection phase and during a corrective maintenance evolution and thoroughly 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 A. INTRODUCTION 
Research conducted in support of this Thesis evaluated how the transition from 
SDLM to IMC prototype has been accomplished.  It addressed how IMC is incorporated 
on the aircraft, current and projected readiness levels and support issues.  This Thesis also 
examined current attitudes towards IMC implementation from several perspectives, 
including management and maintenance personnel at all echelons.  The main objective of 
this thesis was to determine whether implementing the IMC program on the EA-6B 
aircraft is beneficial.   
This chapter identifies conclusions and recommendations for managing the IMC 
program.  These conclusions and recommendations are a result of analysis of background 
research, meetings and personal interviews.  Finally, this thesis concludes by providing 
recommended areas for further study. 
      
B. CONCLUSIONS 
Overall the research has determined that implementing the IMC program based on 
RCM analysis to support preventative maintenance actions on the EA-6B platform is 
beneficial.  Specific conclusions drawn from the research follow. 
1.  ISR cannot continue  status quo to support ISR and IMC field events.  The 
current manning level compared to the demand for depot repair has had the team working 
seven days a week for several months.  Temporarily assigned artisans are not going to 
benefit the team either in the short or long term.  Short term solutions only bandage what 
is a permanent workload.  
2. Despite the fact that readiness levels have not increased in the short term, 
redefining maintenance tasks makes scheduled inspections more realistic than in the 
past.  Many maintenance requirements were based on an event that engineers deemed 
necessary to implement a permanent inspection.  Requirements for the inspection were 
then decided upon based when in the scheduled inspection cycle the panel or area was 
already being inspected.  It was not based on RCM data.  What resulted was an over-
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inspection of the aircraft.  The RCM based preventative maintenance program is a more 
realistic approach to inspecting the aircraft.   
3.  The airframe will continue to age and there will always be another 
readiness degrader that was not anticipated.   This is a result of tired iron and aging 
systems.   As the aircraft continue to deploy to the boat and maintain a rigorous 
deployment cycle, the aircraft will experience failures not seen before. 
4.  The six-month out-of-service period and turn around from a PMI1 event 
will not be achieved until the aircraft has completed one full PMI cycle and the 
modification/upgrade schedule is completed.  Even if the IMC and modification is 
done concurrently, just by the shear complexity of the job, many modifications take over 
six months to complete alone.  In addition, corrosion and material condition 
improvements are not predicted by RCM analysts to be realized until after an aircraft 
completes a full PMI schedule.  
5.  The majority of the depot level repair will be done at the operational site.   
The aircraft is scheduled to go through three depot level field events and be in the fleet 
eight years before returning to the depot for paint and condition inspections.   
6.  Upon receiving an aircraft from the depot, there will continue to be a 
NBNC list, as in the past.  The depot level is not authorized to perform organizational 
level work without approval, or incorporate technical directives if they are not stipulated 
in the contract. 
7.  Aircraft scheduling is predictable with IMC.   This is a result of a fixed 
PED and will allow budgeters and planners to schedule depot inductions. 
 8.   Many IMC program goals have not been realized in the short term: 
-fixed PED.  Eight year depot induction divided into three biannual field depot 
events. 
-Maintain cost neutrality with the current maintenance program.  Average 
projected budget costs have been met. 
-Improve overall material condition of aircraft.  This was evidenced by squadron 
prototype, VAQ 140’s, 364-day inspection. 
-Reduce overall fleet maintenance burden.  Scheduled maintenance has been 
reduced by 65% and probably should have been reduced long before implementing IMC.  
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PMI field events have the potential to increase the maintenance burden during those 
inspection cycles.  
Develop RCM based PM program.  Completed and to the fleet with ongoing 
analysis and revision. 
It is too early in the program to realize an increase in aircraft inventory/PAA, 
except that scheduling is facilitated with a fixed PED.  This will increase forecasted PAA.   
MMH/FH are still double what they were twelve years ago, including the 
prototype squadron.   
Aircraft availability and readiness numbers have been skewed due to the high 
engine failure rate. 
9.  Knowledge to identify and repair structural parts is lacking in both the O 
and I-levels.  This is due to the lack of training and experience in structural repair.   
!0.  Manning at the O and I-levels is inadequate.   MMH/FH have doubled in 
the last 12 years, yet manning levels in the O-level have stayed the same.  The I- level 
needs to be manned at AMD numbers vice BA/NMP. 
     
C. RECOMMENDATIONS   
1.  The IMC program will not be successful if the ISR team is not fully 
manned and supported. In order for PMI field events to be successful and aircraft 
readiness/availability to increase, NADEP North Island has to provide permanent 
manning to the NAS Whidbey ISR team.  If they don’t, then there has to be a procedure 
put in place where the team leader can hire local talent or task NADEP Jacksonville for 
manning.   
 2.  For the program to succeed at the operational level, maintenance 
management must fully support IMC and the MRC’s derived from RCM 
analysis.  To maximize the new maintenance concept’s effectiveness, maintenance 
management must ensure that when a technician enters a space or opens a panel to 
perform corrective maintenance or FOD inspection, that the 18- inch rule applies.  The 
entire area must be inspected for FOD, corrosion, degradation in hardware, obvious 
failures, etc. and fixed before securing the area.  At least generate a MAF if time does 
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not permit the appropriate maintenance action right then.  A clean-as-you-go 
mentality must be instilled in every maintainer. 
 3.  Documentation at the organizational level must be concise and clearly 
describe a failure so that RCM analysts are able to perform accurate FMECA 
analysis. This will identify potential readiness degraders before they become a 
detriment to aircraft availability and supportability.  
 4.  A six month TAT out of the depot will not be realized until after 2008.   
Until then, organizational maintenance must be by-the–book when it comes to 
maintaining the aircraft so that it is a realistic goal. 
 5.  There needs to be a contingency plan in place so that an aircraft can be 
sent to the depot prior to PMI1 if necessary.  An aircraft in such a condition should 
not have to be the burden of the squadron and ISR to repair. 
6.  Current legislation does not allow organizational maintenance to be 
performed on aircraft undergoing depot level maintenance.  Without a change in the 
system, the squadron will continue to receive NBNC lists.   
 7.  A PMI field event can be waivered if necessary.   Inspection teams need to 
be funded to go to forward deployed sites.  There also has to be procedures in place to 
allow the inspection team to repair at forward deployed sites if necessary.  
8.  Time will tell whether program goals are realistic.  
9.  Training must become a priority.  Currently a majority of airframes 
personnel do not have the knowledge required to recognize a failure or perform correct 
repairs.  NATEC expertise and NAMTRAGRUDET must be utilized to the fullest extent 
possible. 
10.  Manpower reviews need to be performed in the squadrons to re -baseline 
manning to match the current workload.  AIMD needs to be manned at AMD 






D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
1.  Cost/benefit analysis done on the value of DITMCO.  The use of the test 
set, DITMCO, was not justified by RCM analysis, however the fleet may not have the 
expertise or the capability to fix something that could have been easily identified and 
troubleshot using the test set.  
  
2.  IMC program analysis on the J52-P408A engine.  The engine has been 
failing at an incredible rate, and two catastrophic failures in the last seven months has led 
to the operational units doing five hour engine oil samples.  Readiness has declined as a 
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APPENDIX  
A. LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AMD ACTIVITY MANNING DOCUMENT 
ASPA AIRCRAFT SERVICE PERIOD ADJUSTMENT 
BA  BASIC AUTHORIZATION 
BAA BACKUP AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZATION 
BCA BUSINESS CASE ANALYSIS 
CFT CONTRACT FIELD TEAM 
CNO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATONS 
COB CURRENT ON BOARD 
DFIT DEPOT FIELD INSPECTION TEAM 
DFRT DEPOT FIELD REPAIR TEAM 
DON DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 
EDVR ENLISTED DISTRIBUTION VERIFICATION REPORT 
FLE FATIGUE LIFE EXPECTANCY 
FMC FULL MISSION CAPABLE 
FMECA FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS
FST FIELD SUPPORT TEAM 
FYDP FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM 
IMC INTEGRATED MAINTENANCE CONCEPT 
IPT INTEGRATED PRODUCT TEAM 
MAF MAINTENANCE ACTION FORM 
MAG MAINTENANCE ACTION GROUP 
MCAP MODIFICATION, CORROSION AND PAINT PROGRAM 
MMH/FH MAINTENANCE MANHOUR PER FLIGHT HOUR 
MRC MAINTENANCE REQUIREMENT CARD 
NAVAIR NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND 
NBNC NOTED BUT NOT CORRECTED 
NDI NON-DESTRUCTIVE INSPECTION 
NMP NAVAL MANPOWER 
OEM ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT MANUFACTURER 
OOS OUT OF SERVICE 
OSP OPERATING SERIVICE PERIOD 
PAA PRIMARY AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED 
PACE PAINT AND CORROSION EVALUATION 
PED PERIOD END DATE 
PM PREVENTATIVE MAINTENANCE 
PMI PHASED MAINTENANCE INTERVAL 
PMI1 PHASED MAINTENANCE INTERVAL DEPOT 
PMIF PHASED MAINTENANCE INTERVAL FIELD 
POB9 PROJECTED ON BOARD NINE MONTHS OUT 
RCM RELIABILITY CENTERED MAINTENANCE 
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SDLM STANDARD DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE 
SE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT 
TAA TOTAL AIRCRAFT AUTHORIZED 
TAI TOTAL AIRCRAFT INVENTORY 















































C. CVWP 2001 3M SUMMARY 
129 128 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 AVG
PERCENT MC 48.6 77.2 65.7 47.8 59.3 79.1 67.1 64.2 52.5 65.7 53.6 62.9 64.4 59.1 61.9 61.9
PERCENT FMC 30.0 68.2 48.3 3.0 45.8 59.9 45.3 44.3 17.2 43.8 24.7 41.2 45.2 20.1 46.8 36.6
PERCENT PMC 18.5 9.0 17.2 45.3 13.5 20.9 21.8 19.9 35.3 22.0 28.8 21.7 19.2 37.5 15.0 25.3
PERCENT NMC 50.6 22.8 30.1 50.1 40.3 22.5 32.9 35.8 47.5 34.4 46.5 33.0 35.6 25.2 38.2 36.1
PERCENT NMCS 10.4 8.4 16.0 23.0 14.3 3.8 7.1 16.3 11.9 8.9 6.7 7.3 13.0 15.0 5.7 11.9
AVG A/C IN REPTG 16.0 4.3 3.5 3.7 3.6 4.3 4.1 4.0 4.6 3.8 4.0 3.3 3.8 4.0 4.1 3.9
ACT A/C IN REPTG 16.2 4.6 6.0 3.7 3.5 4.8 4.8 4.0 4.6 4.0 4.0 3.3 3.9 4.0 4.3 4.2
FLIGHTS 405 52 56 64 54 55 54 95 54 99 81 52 68 82 50 68
FLIGHT HOURS 682.4 116.9 105.8 116.0 94.5 129.2 133.5 181.4 89.0 205.9 134.1 92.1 115.4 157.4 111.8 129.5
A/C UTILIZATION 42.7 26.3 29.6 30.6 24.6 30.6 33.9 45.4 20.1 52.9 33.5 30.3 29.1 37.9 27.8 33.2
DMMH/FH ML-1 56.9 75.2 106.1 54.2 59.8 47.2 46.4 53.7 81.9 44.3 55.3 56.5 57.5 68.2 58.2 60.9
ML-1 IP 3711 699 2172 1565 1302 784 524 0 75 1377 1005 1054 1243 2456 1738 1210
% A799/A127 ML-1 4.3 0.6 10.1 3.4 4.9 5.2 8.6 2.5 1.5 73.6 5.0 2.1 6.1 3.3 5.0 10.5
ML-2 IP 598 145 169 164 178 123 90 0 23 78 156 105 202 189 205 136
% A799/A127 ML-2 4.1 14.4 7.9 7.7 5.8 5.1 6.1 6.5 4.4 5.7 5.1 4.3 6.0 5.8 3.7 5.9
CANN IP 0 12 15 24 16 11 13 14 37 24 16 9 9 38 15 19
CANN MHRS 1256.3 100.7 96.8 184.3 107.0 78.1 88.9 132.1 178.9 127.3 104.8 31.8 67.3 182.5 103.3 115.0
CANN MHRS/FH 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.3 2.3 0.8 0.5 2.0 0.4 1.2 0.4 0.6 1.4 1.0 1.1
PREVENTION IP 408 855 567 327 74 119 133 181 95 126 59 104 175 521 49 207
PREVENTION MHRS 2042.9 3643.7 2710.2 1346.7 252.9 1501.1 525.0 1697.8 446.0 940.3 311.9 464.2 626.7 2507.4 140.8 1110.8
TREATMENT IP 216 178 266 307 38 79 44 292 169 56 82 172 82 698 138 190
TREATMENT MHRS 1154.2 347.8 818.4 246.9 105.9 348.9 89.3 537.7 196.4 287.6 576.0 776.3 266.0 1075.2 309.1 443.7





















































D. SURVEY SUMMARY 
 
1.  Four fleet squadrons were asked the following questions and their responses 
follow each question (March 2002): 
a.  Number of aircraft in squadron: 
 1.  Three 
 2.  Four 
 3.  Three 
 4.  Four 
b.  Number of aircraft IMC prototype : 
 1.  One 
 2.  One 
 3.  None 
 4.  Three 
c.  Number of aircraft under new maintenance concept : 
 1.  One 
 2.  One 
 3.  One 
 4.  Four 
d.  Month you expect to be completely under new concept: 
 1.  August 2002 
 2.  October 2002 
 3.  July 2002 
 4.  All four under new maintenance concept. 
e.  How do the maintainers like the new MRC deck? 
 1.  Confused, but with lots of training, were able to adapt. 
 2.  Great change in improving the inspection requirements. 
 3.  No real opinions yet.  Hasn’t really affected us a much as other 
commands.  Just implemented last month. 





f.  As Management how do you like the new MRC deck? 
 1.  Like it lots.  Will benefit if program is utilized. 
 2.  Excellent changes in inspection cycle. 
 3.  Just implemented first one last month.  No real feel for how it will 
effect maintenance as of yet. 
 4.  I like the new deck, allows greater flexibility. 
g.  Has your readiness changed since the new MRC deck was implemented? 
 1.  Will increase readiness.  By eliminating workload of taking excess 
panels off, which will be covered by a zonal inspection. 
 2.  Haven’t got enough time for an evaluation period.  About the same at 
this time. 
 3.  No change.  Only in implementation for less than one month. 
 4.  Affect on readiness is yet to be seen.  We have had to great of impact 
from mini-mods and other stuff hat has adversely affected our aircraft availability.  We 
should see an improvement in July though. 
h.  What are the advantages you expect with the new maintenance concept? 
 1.  Quicker turn around of aircraft inspections. 
 2.  Quality aircraft upkeep. 
 3.  Less maintenance induced discrepancies from opening up panels that 
don’t need opening.  Easier scheduling, no more ASPAs every twelve months. 
 4.  I hope to se shorter turnarounds for scheduled maintenance. 
i.  Have you realized any of these expected advantages? 
 1.  Too soon to tell. 
 2.  None observed at this time. 
 3.  Not yet.  Just implemented last month. 
 4.  Yes—we experienced increased aircraft availability during our dets as 
a result of shorter inspections, especially since had reduced availability due to 
mods/conversion. 
j.  What are the disadvantages you expect to see with the new maintenance 
concept? 
 1.  Too soon to tell.  But only disadvantage would be that personnel not 
doing a zonal inspection when working in areas fixing other discrepancies. 
 2.  Time period between 56 and 364 day inspection requirements.  Too 
many man hours spent on fixing old parts with no relief in sight. 
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 3.  Extended down time while all gripes worked off prior to inspection 
being completed.  Not able to rob off jet to get other jets up (a well known EA-6B way of 
life.) 
 4.  I expect increased corrosion damage due to lack of preventative 
maintenance and supply shortages when all of the fleet jets get on IMC program as a 
result of more in-depth requirements. 
    
k.  Have you realized any of these disadvantages? 
 1.  Not yet.  Too soon to tell. 
 2.  None observed at this time. 
 3.  Not yet.  No IMC jets at this time. 
 4.  Not really-some supply issues but nothing that wasn’t rela tively short 
term. 
l.  What is your opinion of the IMCF Concept? 
 1.  I like it.  Implement to all aircraft as soon as practical. 
 2.  Great concept, but it put the burden on O level maintainers. 
 3.   Sounds like a god ideas.  I like the every two year vice one year for the 
major inspection.  
 4.  The IMC program is all right.  I think the new MRCs were long 
overdue.  But on the other hand I think they should have just implemented the new MRCs 
with the old ASPA program.  I don’t think this is going to reap the long term cost savings 
they are looking for.  Also NADEP JAX is better suited to handle major repairs and large 
scale cannibalization that will undoubtedly be encountered. 
m.  What condition do you expect an aircraft coming from an IMCD?  Better 
or worse than a SDLM? 
 1.  Better 
 2.  Better 
 3.  Better 
 4.  Better be better and quicker.  Theory has it a lot of the stuff that would 
have been repaired during the standard SDLM will have already been done during field 
events. 
n.  Is the prep for IMCF more labor intensive than for an ASPA? 
 1.  Less intensive. 
 2.  About the same prep. 
 3.  Not really.  We usually try to schedule all major inspection (224) with 
our ASPAs, so it’s about the same as all panels required for the 224 day inspection. 
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 4.  More in-depth.  A lot more panels are opened and more areas are 
inspected. 
o.  Other comments or suggestions. 
 1.  None 
 2.  To turn out quality aircraft, we must have quality replacement parts 
available.  Form an inspection team to do this (IMCF) and cycle every aircraft through 
them.  Automatic waivers for the 364 day inspection while deployed not to exceed the 
next inspection cycle, but perform the inspection as soon as squadron returns. 
 3.  Should be nice while on deployment not having to remove a bunch of 
panels. 
 4.  Overall-I think it is a good program in theory.  But I still think in the 
long term we will have reduced flexibility when transferring jets due to fixed PEDs, but I 
bet more short term and last minute exchanges will happen.  Plus I feel there will be 
several supply back logs that will affect the squadrons that are kind of transparent right 
now because the jets are out of sight out of mind at SDLM.  Now it will be on the Wing 
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